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Abstract
Aggarwal and Klapper study the relationship  between  ownership structure  and firm-specific  factors such as
ownership structure,  corporate  governance,  and the  sales, leverage, and profitability, and  IPO characteristics
initial public offering (IPO) process.  They examine  such as percentage  of equity  locked up,  gross proceeds,
equity ownership by different institutions,  such as  and exchange of listing.  There is also  a strong
foreign and domestic  financial  institutions, banks with  relationship  between ownership by different types of
and without lending relationships,  venture capitalists,  institutions.  Ownership is also tied to bank lending
and corporations prior to an IPO. The authors also  relationships.  Finally, the authors find strong
analyze the relationship  between  ownership structure  relationships between ownership  types and corporate
and corporate governance.  They  use a unique dataset of  governance.  For example, firms with foreign investors
152 Indian  IPOs during the period  1999-2001  to  are more likely to have an outside chief executive  officer
analyze  ownership of shares by main groups of  and offer an employee  stock option plan.
shareholders. The authors  find a relationship  between
This paper-a  product  of  Finance,  Development  Research  Group-is  part  of  a larger  effort  in  the  group  to  study
international  corporate  governance.  Copies  of the paper are  available  free  from  the World  Bank,  1818 H Street  NW,
Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Agnes Yaptenco,  room MC3-446,  telephone  202-473-1823,  fax 202-522-1155,
email  address  ayaptenco@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://
econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at aggarwal@georgetown.edu  or Iklapper@worldbank.org.  July 2003.
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I.  Introduction
A  recent  survey  paper  on  initial  public  offerings  (IPOs)  states,  "the  topic  of share
allocations  and  subsequent  ownership ranks among the  most interesting  issues in IPO research
today"  (Ritter  and Welch,  2002).  Researchers  have  correctly  started  paying  attention to these
institutional issues.  We believe that in order to exarnine allocation  of IPO shares and subsequent
ownership,  it  is first  important  to understand  the  ownership  structure  of the  firm just prior to
going public.  Firms  deliberately  attempt  to change  their  ownership  and  corporate  governance
structure in preparation for going public.  The structure created prior to the offering can influence
the whole IPO process, the allocation process,  and subsequent ownership.  This paper attempts to
partly fill this gap in the current literature.
We  analyze  the  ownership  structure  of firms just  prior to  going  public.  The  different
groups  of owners  examined  include  domestic  and  foreign  institutions,  banks  with  and without
lending  relationships  with  the  firm,  venture  capitalists  (VCs)  and  corporations.  Ownership
structure  is also  related  to  the  corporate  governance  structure  of the  firm.  Proxies  used  for
corporate  governance  include ownership  by insiders,  the role of the founder in management  of
the  firm,  ownership  by  VCs,  and  the  existence  of  employee  stock  option  plans  (ESOPs).
Empirical research  examining  ownership structure of IPOs is quite limited partly due to the lack
of data.  A unique  dataset of Indian IPOs during the period  1999-2001  allows us to examine the
ownership  and  corporate  governance  structure of firms  going public.  The  detailed  data on the
number  of  shares  held  by  the  10  largest  shareholders  allows  us  to  study  the  role  of large
shareholders.  The  analysis  is  also  able  to  shed  light  on  the  role  of financial  institutions  in
corporate  governance.  India provides  an interesting  emerging market  to analyze with its hybrid
2structure similar to market-based  economies  like the U.S.  and U.K.  and bank-based  systems of
Germany  and  Japan.  We  are  also  able  to  examine  the  role  played  by foreign  investors  in
govemance  and performance.  For example,  we find that firms  with foreign  shareholders  have
better corporate  govemance,  are more likely to have  foreign lenders,  and have greater access to
financing. '
We also examine  the characteristics  of firms that have venture  capital participation prior
to  an  IPO.  In the  United  States,  venture  capitalists  (VCs)  are  found  to  take  equity  stakes  in
young  firms  that have  large potential  agency costs.  The  literature  also  finds  that VCs provide
financing  and  in addition  are also  likely to  provide  help  in hiring  management,  serve  on the
board of directors, actively monitor the firm,  and provide advisory services and reputation capital
(Gompers,  1995  and  Lerner,  1995).  They  therefore  provide  both  financial  and  non-financial
services.  Previous  literature  also  discusses  that  VCs  are  more  sensitive  to  the  corporate
governance of the firm than the entrepreneur because of their need for repeated access to capital
markets, which makes  them concerned about their reputation (Baker and Gompers,  1999).  It has
also been suggested that venture capitalists play an important role in the professionalization  of a
firm in addition to their traditional role of a financial intermediary (for example, see Hellman and
Puri,  2001).  In  the  process  of professionalization  of the  firm  VCs may  replace  the  original
founder with an outside professional  CEO.  The role of the venture capitalist becomes  even more
important  as  a  firm prepares  for an  IPO.  The  combination  of the  financial  and non-financial
contributions  increases  the  credibility  of the firm issuing new  equity in the  market  and among
investors.  VCs will monitor the firm to ensure that benefits  are not diverted  to the managers  of
iThe unique ownership and governance  of Indian firms is an example of the "new firm" that Zingales (2000)
recommends further study.
3the  firm.  These issues  become  even  more relevant  in the Indian  environment with weak  legal
enforcement of shareholder protection laws.
We also study the affect of industry and founder on ownership  structure, similar to Faccio
and Lang (2002) who find that in Western Europe large firms and financial firms tend to be more
widely held but small firms and non-financial firms are more closely held.  If the firm is family-
controlled then it is more likely to have top managers  from the controlling family.  They find that
the largest controlling shareholder,  on average,  owns 38.48 percent of voting rights.  Holdemess
and Sheehan  (1988)  study the role of large-block shareholders  and define majority shareholders
as  those who  own 50 percent  or more  of the  outstanding  shares.  In their sample,  at  least  one
non-officer owned more than 10 percent of the stock and an officer owned more than 10 percent
of the  stock in  15  percent of the  sample  firms.  They conclude  that majority  shareholders  are
more involved in direct management and are present  in both small and large firms.  Additionally,
they  find  that  the  motivation  of  individual  majority  shareholders  is  different  from  that  of
institutions.  These studies, however, do not specifically examine IPOs.
Demsetz  and Lehn  (1985)  report that ownership -structure varies  systematically  in ways
consistent  with  value  maximization.  The  variation  is  based  in  factors  such  as  firm  size,
instability of profit rate, and whether the industry is regulated or not.  Brickley,  Lease, and Smith
(1988)  argue that institutions such as mutual funds  and pension  funds  are more likely to oppose
management than banks and insurance companies that derive business interests from the firm.
There is considerable  literature that discusses the role of prestigious underwriters  and ex
ante  uncertainty  and  the  effect  of auditor  quality  (for  example,  Carter  and  Manaster,  1990,
Megginson  and Weiss,  1991, and Willenborg,  1999).  Entrepreneurs also signal  the value of the
firm by retaining a large proportion' of ownership and not selling their shares at the time of going
4public.  Brennan  and  Franks  (1997)  suggest  that  underpricing  is  needed  to  ensure  that  the
offering is oversubscribed.  Oversubscription gives managers the flexibility to discriminate  in the
allocation of shares thereby reducing the possibility of creating substantial  outside blockholders.
This  becomes  particularly  important  if the  entrepreneur  owns  only  a  small  proportion  of the
stock.  Lock-up periods  are  seen as yet another mechanism  by which the uncertainty is reduced
(Field and Hanka, 2001,  and  Brav and  Gompers,  2001).  Different categories  of equity holders
perform  different  monitoring  and  control  functions  that  can  serve  as  signaling  mechanisms.
These  may  have  a  direct  impact  on the price  performance  of an  IPO,  including  underpricing
(Michaely  and Shaw,  1994).  However,  prior to  public listing  is the time  when it is crucial to
signal  firm  value,  and  ownership  structure  can  resolve  some  of the  information  asymmetry
surrounding the IPO.
Our study is the first to examine  the role of institutional  investors  when firms go public.
There have been a few studies  that have examined related  corporate  governance  issues  in India.
Sarkar and Sarkar (2000)  find that blockholdings  by firm directors  increases  firm value  after a
certain  threshold  of ownership  and  that institutional  investors,  such  as  mutual  funds,  are  not
active  in governance.  They do find,  however, that banks  monitor companies  effectively if they
have  a  large  equity  stake and  this  monitoring  is reinforced  by debt  holdings.  Foreign  equity
ownership  is  also  found  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  firm  value.  Chhibber  and  Mazumdar
(1999)  specifically  examine  the  relationship  between  foreign.  ownership  and  accounting
measures  of performance.  Khanna and Palepu (1999)  study the role of institutions  in governing
group-affiliated  companies.
5The rest of the paper is organized  as follows.  Section II describes our unique dataset and
some cross-sectional  characteristics  of our sample.  Section  EII  reports the results of the empirical
analysis.  Section  IV provides a summary and conclusions.
II.  Data
Our primary  data is collected  from Indian  IPO  filings  between January  1999  and  April
2001.2  The sample includes all  152 IPOs issued during the period.  IPOs from all major sectors
including  financial,  media,  telecom,  high-tech,  and  industrial  are  represented.  These  filings
include information on firm characteristics,  IPO characteristics,  and ownership information.  IPO
characteristics  include float percentage,  number of days between opening and closing of the IPO,
gross proceeds,  initial return,  exchange  listing, and whether the lead underwriter  was foreign or
domestic.  Firm  characteristics  include balance sheet and income statement items, such as sales,
leverage,  earnings  before  income  and  taxes  (EBIT)  and  gross  margin.  Information  is  also
included on the age of the firm, the existence of a banking relationship with a foreign bank, and
the industry of the issuer.  Since we have the names of all shareholders  and lenders, we can also
identify firms with equity and lending relationships  with domestic and foreign banks.
The  main  focus  of our  paper  is  to  analyze  ownership  characteristics  that  include
ownership by foreign and  domestic institutions  and also ownership by insiders of the firm.  The
institutions  studied  include  corporations,  financial  institutions,  and  venture  capitalists.  The
corporate  governance  proxies  used  in  the  analysis  are  the  existence  of  an  employee  stock
ownership  plan  and  whether  the  founder  continued  as  the  CEO  of the  firm.  We  also  have
information  on whether  the  firm  is closely  held and by whom.  IndiaCapital,  a private  Indian
financial  information  vendor,  provided information  on the nationality  and  "type" of all  equity
6investors  - whether the  shareholder  is classified  as  an individual,  financial  institution,  venture
capitalist,  or corporation.3 In addition, IndiaCapital  identified whether the CEO was an  original
founder  or  an  outsider  at  the  time  of the  IPO  and  the  nationality  of lenders  and  IPO  lead
managers.
III.  Empirical Results
A.  IPO and Firm Characteristics
Table  1 reports  characteristics of the IPO,  the issuing firm,  and the ownership  structure
for the  full  sample.  The  sample  includes  152  Indian  IPOs  between  January  1999  and  April
4 2001.  The proportion of shares floated  in an IPO on average  is 30 percent.  Insider shares  are
not  allowed  to  trade  during  the  mandatory  lock-up  period  of  36  months.  Both  the  float
percentage  and the lock-up period is much higher than that observed in the U.S.  The Securities
and Exchange  Board  of India  (SEBI)  lays  out  detailed  guidelines  on  lock-up  provisions  that
require the lock-up period to be three years.  The lock-up period starts from the date of allotment
in the public issue or from the date  of commencement  of commercial  production,  whichever  is
later.  SEBI's  guidelines  also  require that the  minimum  float  be  at least 25  percentage  of the
issue size - which we find to be the median float percentage - although SEBI gradually relaxed
the  min  float  requirement  to  10%  on July  21,  2001.5  In  the  U.S.  regulators  do not  set the
minimum  float  or  lock-up  requirements.  The  minimum  float  is  decided  by  the  issuer  and
investment banker, based on funding requirements,  demand for shares, and to allow for sufficient
2  Prior to 1999, IPOs were not filed electronically  and did not have as extensive  disclosure requirements.
3  In general,  "corporations"  are investment vehicles for non-financial  firms.
4  Our sample excludes  five firms that issued IPO prospectuses  but did not list because  they were unable  to receive
the mandatory  90% subscription.
5  We  exclude  float  from the proceeding  summary  tables  comparing  averages across  samples  because  of the  little
variation across firms.  In all cases, float is insignificant.
7aftermarket  liquidity.  The lock-up  period in the U.S. is typically  180 days and is determined by
the investment bank and not the regulators.
The median number of days between opening  and closing of the  IPO is  five days  and is
the time period during which allotment takes place.  The average IPO offering size in our sample
is 291 million rupees  and the median size is 49 million rupees.  The size variation is quite large,
ranging from over 8 billion rupees to about 8 million rupees.  Firms in our sample listed either on
a national exchange, the National  Stock Exchange (NSE) or the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE),
or on only one of the 21 regional  exchanges (for example, the Calcutta, Bangalore,  or Hyderabad
Exchange.)  Indian law  requires firms  to list on at least  one regional  exchange  in addition  to  a
national  exchange  and therefore  Indian  firms  frequently  list simultaneously  on more than  one
exchange.  About half the firms in our sample listed on a national  exchange, which  account  for
almost 90 percent of the total proceeds raised.
We measure  IPO market performance  by the  1-day  return (percentage  change)  from the
offering price to the closing price on the first day of trading.6 The average  initial return of firms
(not shown)  is 99 percent  and the median return  is 38 percent.  Returns range from -60 percent
to over 900 percent, with 70 percent of first day returns being positive.  This is consistent with
Shah (1995)  who finds  a first day return of 105.6%  for firms that commenced  trading between
January  1991  and April  1995.  In addition,  we report market-adjusted  returns using  the Indian
Nifty index  in Table  1.  The mean  and median  market-adjusted  returns  are 74 percent  and  35
percent, respectively.  We  also find that  13 percent  of firms  have  a  foreign  lead IPO  manager,-
which may suggest a greater ability to attract foreign investors  and greater returns.
6 We exclude one firn  with 1-day return equal to 3200.
8The age of the firms varies from less than a year to over 70 years,  with a median  age of
seven  years.7 The  mean  and  median  sales  are  326  million  rupees  and  33  million  rupees,
respectively.  The  mean  and  median  gross  margin  is  0.23  and  0.19,  respectively.  This  low
profitability  may reflect  the  young  age  of firms  and  concentration  in  the  technology  sector,
which often have high start-up costs and initial losses.
The  mean  debt-to-equity  (D/E)  ratio  is  1.53  and  the  median  is  0.14.  The  low  median
usage  of debt  reflects  the  large  number of technology  firms, which  generally  have  few  fixed
assets  and little debt.8  We  identify 20 percent of firms in our sample to have a loan  outstanding
from a foreign bank, which reflects the strong presence of foreign banks in India.  In addition, we
find that 24% of firms  in our  sample  have  both lending  and  equity relationships  with a bank.
Our empirical analysis  examines whether the ability to borrow from a foreign lender is related to
a  firm's  shareholders.  Finally,  our  sample  of firms  can  be  identified  as  5%  financial,  75%
technology, and 20% other (Pharmaceuticals,  Media, etc.)
B.  Ownership Structure
We  find  that  67  percent  of  firms  have  an  insider  blockholder.  Initially,  we  define
blockholders  as  any shareholder  that owns 5 percent  or more of the  stock.  For robustness,  we
also use other ownership  percentage  cutoffs  (10 and  15  percent)  in defining blockholders.  The
large percentage of firms with inside block ownership is not surprising,  because we would expect
company founders  to retain  equity ownership  at least until the time of the  IPO.  In addition,  38
percent  of the  firms  have  at  least  one  VC  blockholder  - defined  as  a  venture  capitalist  or a
corporate  investment vehicle - 34 percent of firms have at least one domestic blockholder and  9
7  Our sample includes  16 firms that had not yet started commercial  operation  at the.time of the IPO.
8 On average, listed Indian firms  in Worldscope have median debt to equity ratio in the range of 0.75-1.00.
9percent  of firms have  a  foreign blockholder.9 Indian law permits banks to own equity  in non-.
financial  firms.  This allows  us to examine more closely the effect of both bank loans and equity
investment,  and the interaction between these two types of investment.  We find that 12 percent
of the  firms  have  bank  shareholders  - 7  percent  of firms  have  at  least  one  Indian  bank
shareholder  and  6 percent  have at least  one  foreign bank shareholder.  This data presents the
opportunity to study the relationship  between financial institutions'  lending relationship with the.
firmn  and  equity  ownership.  These  results  clearly  suggest  that  both  individual  insiders  and
institutions, such as banks and VCs, have significant equity stakes in firms going public.
In addition, we find that foreign institutions - VCs and banks - own equity in 13 percent
of our sample  firms.  As  was previously  discussed,  foreign  banks  have  a  lending relationship
with 20 percent of the firms going public.  In  13  percent of our firms  a foreign  investment bank
also  takes  the  firm  public.  These  initial  results  suggest  that  foreign  institutions  are  actively
involved in  lending money,  owning equity,  and  in serving as  investment  banks  to firms  going
public.  We also find that 22 percent of firms have at least one insider controlling more than 20
percent of total equity.10 These firms, where inside managers  are also conitrolling  shareholders,
may identify an environment of poor corporate  governance.  In addition, we find that  13 percent
of firms have a VC as a controlling shareholder  that owns more than 20 percent of total equity.
This  ownership  information  allows  us  to examine  the  relationship  between  ownership  structure
and corporate governance.
We  also  include  information  on  ownership  structure  that  may  relate  to  the  corporate
governance  of firms at the time of their IPO.  About 30 percent  of firms  offer an ESOP, which
may provide incentives  to managers  to act more on behalf of shareholders.  Less than 5 percent
9 Of the  39%  of non-bank  institutional  owners,  12%  or  9 firns  have  investors  explicitly  identified  as  venture
capitalists.
10of firms  have replaced  their CEO with an outsider,  the remaining  firms have  a founder  as their
CEO.
C.  Ownership Types
Table  2,  Column  1 classifies  issuers  based  on  whether  a  Bank,  VC  or  Insider  is  a
blockholder,  defined as a shareholder that owns more than 5 percent of equity.  In  18 firms banks
hold equity positions  at the time of going public.  Firms in which  banks hold equity are much
more likely to  be older and larger.  They also  have higher  leverage  ratios,  which  may suggest
that an equity relationship  improves access to financing.  33 percent of bank-owned  issuers use a
foreign  lead underwriter  as compared to 10 percent for the non-banked  owned group; 44 percent
have  a  lending  relationship  with  a  foreign  bank  as  compared  to  17  percent  for  the  non-bank
group; and 56 percent of them have  foreign ownership as compared to 8 percent for the non-bank
owned group.  All of these  differences  in means  are statistically significant.  Therefore,  we can
conclude  that  bank ownership  and  foreign  participation  go  together.  We  also  find that  bank
ownership results in higher underpricing.  The mean initial return spreads are  116.99 percent for
the bank-owned  group and 67.95 percent for non-bank owned group with the difference  in means
being  statistically  significant.  If banks have  ownership  then the firm  is more likely  to have an
ESOP.  In addition,  firms  with a bank blockholder  are  significantly  more  likely to  have a  VC
investor  that  controls  more  than  20  percent  of equity.  This  supports  our  prior  assertion  that
banks and VCs invest jointly and by taking significant equity positions.
Table  2, Column 2 reports the results based on VC ownership.  VCs own an equity stake
in  57  firms  with  foreign  VCs  owning  equity  in  14  firms.  VC  ownership  is  associated  with  a
greater  likelihood of ESOPs.  40 percent of firms with VC ownership have  ESOPs but only 23
percent  of firms with  no VC  ownership have  ESOPs.  Our finding that firms  with institutional
'  Claessens, et al. (2000)  identify controlling shareholders  as those with greater than 20% equity stake.investors  - banks  or VCs  - are  more likely to have ESOPs suggests  that institutional investors
help to professionalize  the firm  and improve governance.  VC  ownership  also results  in higher
foreign participation.  In 32 percent of VC owned firms, a foreign bank or a foreign VC holds an
equity stake, versus 2 percent in firms without VC equity stakes, a significant difference.  In 32
percent of firms there is a lending relationship with a foreign bank, which is significantly larger
than  the  14  percent  of firms  without  VC  blockholders.  We  also  find  that  firms  with  VC
blockholders  are  significantly  older, have  larger  IPO proceeds,  and are more likely to list on a
major Indian exchange.  This may suggest that ex-ante VCs  invest in firms  with greater listing
potential.
In Table 2, Column 3 we examine firms with insider blockholders.  These firms tend to
be smaller, as measured by total sales and total IPO proceeds.  In addition we find these firms to
be  significantly  less  profitable  (as  measured  by  gross  margin)  and have  less  investment  (as
measured as investment to sales).  Interestingly, we find that these firms are less likely to have a
VC with ownership greater than 20 percent, suggesting that VCs may discourage large individual
shareholdings.
D.  Corporate  Governance
Next,  in  Table  3 we examine  the  characteristics  of issuers  based  on their  govemance
structure.  Three proxies  are used for corporate  governance:  whether the firm has an ESOP or
not;  whether the  firm  is  closely held by VCs  or not;  and whether the  firm is closely held by
insiders or not.  Closely held firms  are  defined  as those  in which insider managers  own more
than 20 percent of the total common equity.  It would have been useful to have other proxies for
corporate  governance,  such  as* composition  of  the  board  and  audit  committee,  but  this
information was not available.
12In Table 3, Column 1 the dummy variable  for ESOP takes on a value equal to one if the
issuer has an ESOP and zero otherwise.  Firms that have ESOPs, on average, are more likely to
have a lending relationship with a foreign bank and both foreign banks and foreign corporations
are more likely to have an equity stake in the firm.  The difference in means between the ESOP
group of firms and non-ESOP group of firms is statistically  significant for the variables foreign
lender, foreign bank equity, and foreign VC equity (not shown).  These results suggest that firms
with ESOPs  also  have stronger  relationships  with foreign  institutions,  both lenders  and  equity
holders.
In  Column  2  the  sample  is  classified  based  on  whether  a  VC  has  a  controlling
shareholding,  defined as more than 20 percent of equity.  We find that these firms have larger
IPO  proceeds  and  are more  profitable,  as  measured  by gross  margin.  We  cannot  imply the
direction of causality between  VC ownership  and profitability,  since it may be the case that VCs
invest in more profitable firms.  We also find a link with foreign lenders  and foreign ownership.
Firms with controlling VC ownership may be more likely to access foreign lenders because they
are  more  profitable,  or  because  the  VC  uses  its  bank  relationships  to  help  the  firm  access
financing.  Again, we find a strongly significant relationship between VC and bank investments
- we find firms with more than 20 percent VC equity holdings  significantly more likely to have
more  than  20  percent  bank  equity  stakes  and  significantly  less  likely  to  have  insider
blockholders.  This suggests that VC investors are unlikely to take a large equity stake in a firm
that is  controlled by insiders.  These firms  are also more likely to issue  ESOPs.  Column 3 is
classified by insider ownership,  the insider dummy equals one if any Indian individual owns 20
percent or more of equity and zero  otherwise.  We find no significant differences  between the
13samples, with the exception that as discussed above, firms with insider control are less likely to
also have large VC ownership.
To summarize the relationship between proxies for govemance and ownership  structure,
we find that firms  with  foreign  bank  and/or  VC investment  are  more  likely  to offer  ESOPs.
Furthermore,  we find that firms with large  VC  and bank  equity stakes  are  less likely  to have
insider blockholders.  These  results  suggest  an  added  benefit of increased  foreign  investment
abroad is potential improvements in local corporate governance.
E.  Foreign  Financial  Firms
In  Table  4  we  examine  the  differences  in  the  corporate  governance  and  ownership
structure  of firms  that do  and do  not have  a  foreign  lender,  foreign  lead banks,  and  foreign
owner.  This analysis and the results as reported in Table 4 overlap with our earlier analysis.  The
conclusion  is again that foreign  lenders,  foreign lead underwriters,  and foreign  equity investors
(both banks and VCs)  all participate in IPO deals together.  Not only do they tend to bring each
other  to  the  table  but  it  is  likely  that  foreign  equity  investors  extend  their  own  banking
relationships  to the firms  in which they invest.  We find almost identical  results  for  summary
statistics  by firms with and without  foreign lenders  and firms with and without foreign owners
(Columns I and 2).  Firms with foreign  lenders  or foreign owners  are on average  older, larger,
and more leveraged.  Their IPO are larger in size and are more likely to list on a major exchange.
In addition, firms with foreign lenders and owners are more likely to offer ESOPs.
Column  3 classifies  firms  based  on  whether  the  lead  manager  for  the  offering  was  a
foreign bank or not.  Foreign banks are more likely to be the lead manager  for larger offerings on
a  major  exchange,  of  firms  significantly  characterized  as  older,  larger,  and  having  higher
leverage.  There  is  more  likelihood  of bank  blockholder  and  controlling  ownership.  It  is
14interesting to note that the mean initial return  spread of 55.79 percent is significantly  lower for
foreign lead underwriters than 77.07 percent for Indian lead manager offerings.  We know larger
offerings have lower underpricing and these results might be driven by the size of the offering.  It
is also possible that foreign lead managers are better at pricing the offering.
F.  Corporate  Governance and Ownership in a Multivariate  Framework
Table  5 shows logit  tests  of the relationship  between  ownership  types.  Four different
models  are  estimated  with the  type  of ownership  as the  dependant  variable.  The  dependent
variables  are equal  to  1 in the case of ownership  type  (Bank, VC,  VC_20,  and Insiders).  The
independent variables  are dummies  equal  to 1 if a foreign bank owns  equity and 0 otherwise;  a
dummy  equal  to  1 if a  domestic  bank  owns  equity  and  0  otherwise;  dummy  equal  to  1 if a
foreign VC owns equity and 0 otherwise; a dummy equal to 1 if a domestic VC owns equity and
0 otherwise;  dummies  for  technology and  financial  sector IPOs;  and the  natural  log of age."
For example, Columns 1 and 2 shows a significant positive relationship between VC investments
and bank investment.  This symbiotic relationship between bank and VC ownbrship  may suggest
a method  to  approach  information  opaqueness  in  emerging  markets  - foreign  non-financial
investors  may depend  on the information  gathering  and relationship  between  local  banks  and
firms in making investment decisions.  Although we do not have information on the sequence of
investors,  we hypothesize  that  foreign VCs depend on the  signal of local bank  shareholders  in
making  investment  decisions.  We  also  find  that  firms  with  institutional  investors  are
significantly older.
Column 3 looks  at the relationship  between  insider blockholders  and other institutions.
We do  not find any significant relationship  with institutional  investors,  but find a significantly
1 We  estimated  models  including  other  firm-specific  and  IPO-specific  variables  but  they  were  generally  not
statistically significant and are not reported here.negative  relationship with the financial  sector dummy.  This  is consistent with expectations  that
whereas  industries such  as technology and services may be conceived  with less  start-up capital,
financial  firms require  large  capital  infusions  - and risk management  and  MIS expertise  - that
institutional  investors  (such  as  banks  and  other  financial  institutions)  can  offer.  Column  4
supports  our previous  univariate  result that  firms with  large VC  investments  are  less likely  to
have  insider  blockholders.  This  may  be  explained  by  VCs  reluctance  to  invest  in  firms
controlled by local shareholders.
Table  6  uses  logit  regressions  to  test the  relationship  between  ownership  and  foreign
participation  and between governance and foreign participation.  Column  1 shows that firms with
access  to  foreign  debt  are  more  likely  to  have  foreign  shareholders.  This  confirms  our
hypothesis that awsymbiotic relationship  exists between foreign  lenders and investors.  Column 2
shows that firms with a foreign lead underwriter  are more likely to have a bank blockholder, who
may also lend to the firm.  This may offer evidence of the benefit of universal banking to Indian
firms.  Column  3  shows  no  significant  relationship  between  ESOPs  and  ownership  types,
although it is significantly and positively related to foreign blockholders.  Column 4 shows that
CEOs are more  likely to  be founders  in firms with  inside shareholders  and  less likely  in firms
with foreign blockholders.  This supports our previous assertion that large insider ownership may
delay improvements  in governance  and that foreign  investors may introduce  "best practices"  of
international corporate governance.
Table  7  uses  OLS  regressions  to  test  the  relationship  between  ownership  and
performance.  We use two measures of ownership - at the 5 percent and 20 percent level - since
non-controlling ownership stakes may not give blockholders enough power to make management
and/or strategy decisions.  Column  1 finds no relationship between ROA and ownership  types at
165 percent.  This may suggest that our previous findings of relationships  between ownership  and
firm characteristics  is not driven by ex-ante differences  in firm performance  that endogenously
determine investor types (i.e. VCs are more likely to invest  in more profitable  firms).  However,
in  Column  2  we  find a  positive  relationship  between  VC  ownership  at 20 percent  and ROA.
Column 3 and 4 show that firms with insider blockholders have significantly lower gross margin
and  again  offers  evidence  that  large  VC shareholding  is related to higher performance.  These
findings  may  reflect  the  ex-ante  decision  of  VCs  to  invest  in  better  performing  firms.
Alternatively,  we  have  shown  that  large  VC  ownership  is  associated  with  better  corporate
governance  (such  as the  issuance  of ESOPs  and the replacement of the  inside  CEO)  and these
findings  may  also  be  interpreted  as  additional  support  for  previous  findings  of a  positive
relationship  between  better  corporate  governance  and performance  (Klapper  and Love,  2002,
Black,  2001,  Gompers,  Ishi, and Metrick,  2001).  Finally,  Columns 5 and  6 test the relationship
between access to financing and ownership.  We find that firms with large VC investments have
lower debt ratios, but this may reflect their relatively greater access to equity.
IV.  Summary and Conclusions
This paper examines  the ownership  and corporate  governance  structure of firms prior to
going  public  using  a  sample of Indian  IPOs.  We  believe  it  is  the  first  time  that  ownership
structure  has  been analyzed just before  a  firm  goes public.  Firms  doing IPOs  are particularly
motivated to have the "appropriate"  ownership structure so that it can serve as a signaling device
to the market.  This is also the point in time of a firm's history when information asymmetry can
be high.  Firms make major realignments  to their ownership and corporate governance  structure
in preparation  for going public.  The ownership  structure just prior to the IPO can affect the IPO
17process including the marketing of the offering, allocation of the IPO, and subsequent ownership
of the firm.  Our paper relates to the literature that has examined the reputation of underwriters,
auditors,  insider  holdings,  and  lock-up  provisions  in  reducing  ex  ante  uncertainty  as  well  as
ownership structure as a way to mitigate some of the information  asymmetry.  We also associate
ownership with proxies for corporate governance  in the Indian IPO market.
The paper has  specifically  attempted to answer three questions:  1) Who owns  equity in
firms just prior to going public and what is the role of domestic  and foreign institutions, such as
banks,  VCs,  and  lenders?  2) What  are  the  determinants  of ownership?  3)  Does  institutional
ownership have any affect on the corporate  governance  practices of the firm?  First, we find that
both foreign and domestic  banks and VCs hold equity stakes in a large proportion of our sample.
Institutions tend to invest as a group, therefore, if a VC holds an equity stake then a bank is also
likely  to  hold  an  equity  stake.  Second,  there  is  a  strong  positive  relation  between  a  foreign
equity stake  and a  foreign bank  lending  relationship.  Third,  equity holding  by institutions  in
general  and  foreign  institutions  in  particular  is  positively related  to the corporate  governance
practices of the firm, as measured by the existence of ESOPs and role of the founder in the firm.
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20Table  1: IPO, Firm, and Ownership Characteristics
The table  reports  the mean,  median,  standard  deviation,  minimum,  and maximum of several  variables  measuring
IPO  characteristics,  firm  characteristics,  and  ownership  characteristics  of  159  IPOs  in  India  during  the  period
January  1999  to April 2001.  IPO  characteristics  include:  Float is the percentage  of shares  offered in  the offering;
Proceeds is the amount raised (in Rs million); Days is the number of days from the opening  to the close of the IPO;
Initial Return Spread is the percentage  return on the IPO  from the offer price  to the IPO's closing price  on the first
day of trade adjusted  for market movements;.Listing  is a dummy equal to  1 if the  firm lists on a national  exchange
(NSE  or  BSE); Foreign Lead is a  dummy  equal  to  I  if the  firm  had  a foreign  lead  banker  for  its  IPO.  Firm
characteristics  for year prior to  listing include: Age of the firm; Sales of the firm; Gross margin is the ratio of EBIT
to sales; Debt/equity is  the ratio of total  debt  to  the book value of equity; Investment to Sales is the ratio of total
investment  to total  sales;  Foreign Lender is  a dummy equal  to  1 if the firm  has  a foreign  banking  relationship;
Lender/Owner equals I if the firm has at least one lender that is also an owner.  Financial  and Technology are sector
dummies.  Ownership  characteristics  include:  ESOP is  a  dunmmy  equal  to  I  if the  firm offers  an employee  stock
option plan; CEO Founder  equals I if the CEO is the company founder; Inside Owner equals  I  if insiders  own more
than 5% of total  shares; Bank Owner_For and Bank Owner Dom equals 1 if a domestic  or foreign bank owns more
than  5% of total  shares,  respectively;  VC Owner_Dom and  VC Owner-For  equals  1 if a domestic  or foreign  VC
owns more than  5% of total shares, respectively;  Foreign  Owner equals  1 if any foreign owner owns more than 5%
of total shares;  Insider20 equals  1 if an  inside  owner owns more  than 20%  of total shares;  VC20 equals  I if a VC
owns more than 20% of total shares.
N  Mean  I  Median  Std. Dev  Min.  Max.
IPO Characteristics  . l
Proceeds (IPO Size)  152  290.77  49.00  977.76  7.50  8236.00
Float  152  29.27  25.00  14.38  5.48  79.18
Days  151  7.81  5.00  20.02  2.00  183.00
Initial  Return Spread  129  74.08  35.88  146.82  -59.01  917.96
Listing  152  0.49  0.00  0.5  0.00  1.00
Foreign  Lead  152  0.13  0.00  0.33  0.00  1.00
Firm Characteristics
Age  152  7.31  6.53  5.04  0.00  70.00
Sales  124  326.58  33.05  1808.83  0.17  19819.80
Gross Margin  117  0.23  0.19  0.17  0.01  0.95
Debt/Equity  136  1.53  0.14  8.17  0.00  94.07
Book to Mkt  121  2.06  1.04  2.03  0.26  9.85
Investment to Sales  110  2.04  0.00  15.02  0.00  153.98
Foreign  Lender  152  .0.2  0.00  0.4  0.00  1.00
Lender/Owner  152  0.24  0.00  0.43  0.00  1.00
Financial  152  0.05  0.00  0.21  0.00  1.00
Technology  152  0.74  1.00  0.44  0.00  1.00
Ownership and Governance  Characteristics
Inside Owner  152  0.67  1.00  0.47  0.00  1.00
Bank Owner_Domestic  152  0.07  0.00  0.26  0.00  1.00
Bank Owner_Foreign  152  0.06  0.00  0.24  0.00  1.00
VC Owner_Domestic  152  0.34  0.00  0.47  0.00  1.00
VC Owner_Foreign  152  0.09  0.00  0.28  0.00  1.00
Foreign Owner  152  0.13  0.00  0.34  0.00  1.00
Insider_20  152  0.22  0.00  0.41  0.00  1.00
VC_20  152  0.13  0.00  0.34  0.00  1.00
Bank_20  152  0.03  0.00  0.16  0.00  1.00
ESOP  152  0.3  0.00  0.46  0.00  1.00
CEO  152  0.95  1.00  0.22  0.00  1.00
21Table 2:  Differences  in Ownership Based on Role  of Ownership Types (Means)
The  table  examines  the  differences  in  ownership  types of issuing  firms  prior  to an  IPO.  Bank,  VC,  and  Insider
indicate  equity shareholdings  greater than  5 percent.  Proceeds is the amount raised  (in Rs million);  Initial Return
Spread is the percentage  return on the IPO  from the offer price  to the IPO's  closing price on the first day of trade;
Listing is  a dummy  equal  to  1 if the  firm lists on  a national  exchange (NSE  or BSE);  Foreign Lead is  a dummy
equal to I if the firm had a foreign lead banker for its IPO.  Firm characteristics  for year prior to listing include: Age
of the firm; Sales of the firm;  Gross margin is the ratio of EBIT to sales; Debt/equity is the ratio of total debt  to the
book value of equity; Investment to Sales is the ratio of total investment  to total sales;  Foreign  Lender is a dummy
equal  to I if the firm has a foreign banking relationship;  Financial  and Technology are sector dummies.  Ownership
characteristics  include:  ESOP is  a dummy  equal  to  I  if the  firm offers  an  employee  stock  option plan;  CEO
Founder  equals  1 if the CEO is the company founder; Inside Owner equals 1 if insiders own more than 5% of total
shares; Bank Owner equals 1 if a bank owns more than 5% of total  shares;  VC Owner equals  I if a VC owns  more
than 5% of total shares;  Foreign Owner equals  I if any foreign  owner owns  more than 5% of total  shares; Insider20
equals I if an inside owner owns more than 20% of total shares;  VC20 equals I if a VC owns more than 20% of total
shares.  Asterisks (***,  **, *) denote  statistical  significance  between the two mean  differences  at the  1%,  5%,  and
10% level (respectively).
(1)  (2)  T  (3)
Bank  VC  Insider
(18 firms =1)  |  (57 firms =1)  (102 firms =1)
=0  =1 _  _=0  =1  _=0  =1
Firm and IPO Characteristics
Age  6.92  10.23***  6.67  8.39**  6.42  7.75*
Sales  150.65  1433.92***  387.43  230.25  733.98*  159.92
Initial  Return Spread  67.95  116.98**  64.67  89.77  81.81  70.57
Listing  0.49  0.56  0.43  0.6**  0.54  0.47
Proceeds (IPO  Size)  265.56  478.5  180.76  474.13**  500.51**  187.96
Gross Margin  0.22  0.24  0.21  0.25  0.3***  0.2
Debt/Equity  0.69  7.38***  1.75  1.17  2.83  0.93
Investment to Sales  2.3  0.5  0.94  3.82  7.1**  0.14
Book to Mkt  1.89  3.76***  1.65  2.78***  1.33  2.39***
Foreign  Lender  0.17  0.44***  0.14  0.32***  0.18  0.22
Foreign  Lead  0.1  0.33***  0.12  0.14  0.1  0.14
Financial  0.03  0.17***  0.05  0.04  0.1**  0.02
Technology  0.78***  0.44  0.74  0.74  0.74  0.74
Ownership and Governance  Characteristics
Bank Owner  0  1  0.07  0.19**  0.1  0.13
VC Owner  0.34  0.61**  0  1  0.36  0.38
Inside Owner  0.66  0.72  0.66  0.68  0  1
Foreign Owner  0.07  0.56***  0.02  0.32***  0.16  0.12
ESOP  0.28  0.44*  0.23  0.4**  0.16  0.36
CEO Founder  0.96  0.89  0.96  0.93  0.88  0.98***
Bank_20  0  0.22***  0.02  0.04  0.04  0.02
VC_20  0.11  0.28**  0  0.35***  0.2**  0.1
Insider_20  0.22  0.17  0.22  0.21  0  0.32***
22Table 3: Differences  Based on Governance Characteristics
The  table  examines  the  differences  in  corporate  governance  of issuing  firms  prior  to  an  IPO.  ESOP indicates
whether  the  firm  has  an  ESOP;  VC_20 indicates  whether  a  VC  that  owns  more  than  20%  of total  equity;  and
Insider_20 indicates whether an insider owns more than 20% of total equity.  Proceeds is the amount raised  (in Rs
million); Initial  Return Spread  is the percentage return on the IPO from the offer price to the IPO's closing price on
the first day of trade adjusted  for market movements; Listing is a dummy  equal to 1 if the firm lists on a national
exchange  (NSE or BSE); Foreign  Lead is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm had a foreign lead banker for its IPO.  Firm
characteristics  for year prior to listing include: Age of the firm; Sales of the firm; Gross margin is the ratio of EBIT
to sales;  Debt/equity is the ratio  of total  debt to the book value of equity; Investment to Sales is the  ratio of total
investment  to total  sales;  Foreign Lender is  a dummy equal  to  1 if the firm  has  a foreign  banking  relationship;
Financial  and  Technology are sector dummies.  Ownership  characteristics  include: ESOP is a dummy equal to  1 if
the firm offers  an employee  stock option plan; CEO Founder equals  1 if the CEO  is the company founder;  Inside
Owner equals  1 if insiders own more than 5% of total shares; Bank Owner equals 1 if a bank owns more than 5%  of
total shares;  VC Owner equals  1 if a VC owns more than 5% of total shares; Foreign Owner equals  1 if any foreign
owner owns more than 5% of total shares; Insider20  equals 1 if an inside owner owns more than 20% of total shares;
VC20 equals  I if a VC  owns more than 20% of total  shares.  Asterisks  (***,  **, *) denote  statistical  significance
between the two mean differences at the 1%, 5%, and 10%/ level (respectively).
(1)  (2)  (3)
ESOP  VC  20  Insider 20
(45 firms =1)  (20 firms =1)  (33 firms =1)
I'  =0  =1  =0  =1  =0  =1
Firm and IPO Characteristics
Age  6.79  8.57**  7.18  8.22  7.26  7.51
Sales  366.23  229.66  323.77  345.55  394.47  93.82
Initial  Return Spread  62.54  101.43  69.91  99  70.26  86.6
Listing  0.45  0.6**  0.45  0.75***  0.49  0.52
Proceeds (IPO  Size)  246.7  395.57  231.86  679.62**  326.01  163.69
Gross Margin  0.24  0.2  0.21  0.32***  0.22  0.23
Debt/Equity  1.72  1.07  1.58  1.24  1.73  0.87
nvestment to Sales  2.81  0.08  2.35  0.24  2.62  0.18
Book to Mkt  1.64  3.1***  1.92  3.07**  1.82  2.83***
Foreign  Lender  0.11  0.42***  0.17  0.45***  0.19  0.24
Foreign  Lead  0.1  0.18  0.13  0.1  0.12  0.15
Financial  0.07**  0  0.05  0.05  0.06*  0
Technology  0.72  0.78  0.75  0.65  0.76*  0.64
Ownership and Governance Characteristics
Bank Owner  0.09  0.18*  0.1  0.25**  0.13  0.09
VC Owner  0.32  0.51**  0.28  1  0.38  0.36
Inside Owner  0.61  0.82***  0.7**  0.5  0.58  1***
Foreign  Owner  0.08  0.24***  0.06  0.6***  0.13  0.15
ESOP  0  1  0.27  0.5**  0.29  0.33
CEO Founder  0.95  0.93  0.95  0.9  0.94  0.97
Bank_20  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.1**  -0.03  0
VC_20  0.09  0;22**  0  1  0.15*  0.06
Insider_20  0.21  0.24  0.23*  0.1  0  1
23Table 4: Differences  in Ownership based on the Role of Foreign Financial Firms (Means)
The  table  examines  the  differences  in  the role  of foreigners  in  issuing  firms  prior  to an  IPO.  Foreign Lender
indicates  whether  the firm has a loan  from  a foreign  bank; Foreign Owner indicates  if a foreign shareholder owns
more than  5% of equity; Foreign  Lead indicates  if the firm had a foreign IPO underwriter.  Proceeds  is the amount
raised (in Rs  million); Initial Return Spread is the percentage  return on the IPO  from the offer price  to the IPO's
closing price on the first day of trade adjusted for market movements; Listing is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm lists
on a national  exchange  (NSE or BSE); Foreign  Lead is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm had a foreign lead banker for
its IPO.  Firm characteristics  for year prior to listing include: Age of the firm; Sales of the firm;  Gross margin is the
ratio of EBIT to sales;  Debt/equity is the ratio of total debt to  the book value  of equity; Investment to Sales is  the
ratio  of total  investment  to  total  sales;  Foreign Lender is a dummy  equal  to  1 if the  firm has  a foreign banking
relationship;  Financial  and Technology are sector dummies.  Ownership characteristics  include: ESOP is a dummy
equal  to  1 if the  firm offers  an  employee  stock option plan;  CEO Founder equals  1 if the CEO  is  the company
founder; Inside Owner equals  1 if insiders  own more than  5% of total shares;  Bank Owner equals  1 if a bank owns
more than 5% of total shares;  VC Owner equals  I if a VC owns more than 5% of total  shares; Foreign  Owner equals
1 if any  foreign owner owns  more than 5%  of total  shares; Insider20 equals  1 if an  inside  owner owns  more than
20%  of total  shares;  VC20  equals  1 if a VC owns  more  than 20%  of total  shares.  Asterisks  (***,  **, *) denote
statistical significance between the two mean differences  at the  1%, 5%, and  10% level (respectively).
(1)  (2)  (3)
Foreign Lender  Foreign Owner  Foreign Lead
(31 firms =1)  (20 firms =1)  (19  firms =1)
=0  =1  =0  =1  =0  =1
Firm Characteristics
Age  6.64  9.96***  6.96  9.64**  6.81  10.82***
Sales  64.68  1184.55***  142.31  1344.94***  105.17  1720.19***
Initial Return Spread  65.34  103.91  65.99  117.77  77.07**  55.79
Listing  0.43  0.74***  0.45  0.75***  0.45  0.79***
Proceeds  (IPO Size)  93.41  1061.14***  200.72  885.12***  169.27  1141.33***
Gross Margin  0.23  0.21  0.22  0.26  0.22  0.23
Debt/Equity  0.53  4.93***  0.66  6.91***  0.68  7.09***
Investment to Sales  2.68  0.26  2.35  0.46  2.35  0.32
Book to Mkt  1.59  4.09***  1.88  3.74***  1.73  5.12***
Foreign  Lender  0  1  0.15  0.55***  0.15  0.58***
Foreign  Lead  0.07  0.35***  0.11  0.2  0  1
Financial  0.05  0.03  0.04  0.1  0.04  0.11 *
Technology  0.77**  0.61  0.77**  0.55  0.78***  0.42
Ownership and Governance Characteristics
Bank Owner  0.08  0.26***  0.06  0.5***  0.09  0.32***
VC Owner  0.32  0.58***  0.3  0.9***  0.37  0.42
Inside Owner  0.66  0.71  0.68  0.6  0.66  0.74
Foreign Owner  0.07  0.35***  0  1  0.12  0.21
ESOP  0.21  0.61***  0.26  0.55***  0.28  0.42
CEO Founder  0.97**  0.87  0.97***  0.8  0.95  0.89
Bank_20  0.03  0  0.02  0.1**  0.02  0.11**
VC_20  0.09  0.29***  0.06  0.6***  0.14  0.11
Insider_20  0.21  0.26  0.21  0.25  0.21  0.26
24Table 5:  Logit Tests of Ownership
The dependent variables  include whether the firm has a Bank, VC, or Insider blockholder with 5% of more  of equity
holdings  or whether  the firm has a  VC with  20% of more of shares.  Independent  variables  include:  Bank Owner
equal to  1 if a bank owns more than 5%  of total shares;  VC Owner equal  to  1 if a VC owns more than 5% of total
shares;  Insider Owner equal  to  I if an individual  firm insider owns  more than 5% of total shares;  Technology and
Financial  sector dummies; Ln_Age equal to the logged age of the firm at the time of the IPO.  Asterisks (***,  **, *)
denote statistical significance  at the  1%, 5%, and  10% level  (respectively).  The number of dependent  observations
equal to 1 is in brackets.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Bank  VC  INSIDER  VC_20
Bank Owner  1.079*  0.364  1.141
0.591  (0.619)  0.719
VC Owner  1.151*  0.178
(0.593)  (0.404)
0.413  -0.191  -1.206** Inside Owner  . (0.621)  (0.411)  (0.568)
-1.026  0.329  -0.303  -0.329 Technology  (0.633)  (0.459)  (0.501)  (0.666)
1.36  -1.001  -2.397***  -1.432 Financial  (1.032)  (1.16)  (1.102)  (1.27)
0.746*.  0.595**  0.417*  0.426
Ln-Age  (0.4)  (0.246)  (0.233)  (0.382
-3.803***  -1.763**  0.413  -1.820* Intercept  (1.048)  (0.7)  (0.633)  (1.009)
No observations  151  151  151  151
% concordant  80.3  66.9  69.2  71.6
25Table 6: Logit Tests of Foreign Lending and Underwriting
The dependent variables  include whether the firm borrows from a foreign bank; whether the firm had a foreign bank
as its lead underwriter;  whether the firm issues ESOPs,  an whether the CEO  is' the company  founder.  Independent
variables include: Bank Owner equal to 1 if a bank owns more than 5% of total shares;  VC Owner equal to I if a VC
owns  more than  5% of total  shares;  Insider equal  to  1 if an individual  firm insider owns  more  than  5%  of total
shares;  Technology and Financial  sector dummies;  Ln_Age  equal to the 'logged  age of the firm at  the  time  of the
IPO.  Asterisks (***,  **, *) denote statistical  significance  at the  1%,  5%, and 10% level  (respectively).  The number
of dependent  observations equal to I is in brackets.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Foreign  Foreign  ESOP  CEO Founder
Bank  Lead
0.392  1.251*  0.099  -0.454
Bank Owner  (0.656)  (0.765)  (0.658)  (1.095)
VC Owner  0.364  0.050  0.336  0.848
(0.515)  (0.575)  (0.423)  (1.417)
Inside Olwner  -0.027  0.184  1.158  1.937*
(0.512)  (0.602)  (9.874)  (1.072)
1.387**  -0.569  1.239*  -2.836*
Foreign Owner  (0.698)  (0.977)  (0.682)  (1.859)
-0.423  -1.248**  0.722  -0.818 Technology  (0.534)  (0.577)  (0.548)  (0.801)
-1.672  -0.159 Financial  (1.051)  (0.880)
0.7643*  -0.692  0.349  0.234 Ln_Age  (0.418)  (0.515)  (0.310)  (0.61)
-2.902***  -2.803**  -3.207*  2.756
Intercept  (0.968)  (1.202)  (0.967)  (1.532)
No observations  151  151  151  151
% concordant  77.6  76.9  79.3  86.9
26Table 7:  OLS Tests of Performance
The  dependent  variables  are  two  measures  of firm  performance:  ROA  and gross  margin.  Independent  variables
include:  Bank Owner 5 equal  to I  if a bank owns more than 5%  of total shares;  VC Owner 5  equal  to I  if a VC
owns more than 5% of total shares;  Inside  5 r equal  to I if an individual  firm insider  owns more than 5%  of total
shares; Bank Owner 20 equal to I if a bank owns more  than 20% of total  shares;  VC Owner 20 equal to I if a VC
owns more than 20% of total shares;  Insider_20  equal to I if an individual firm insider owns more than 20% of total
shares;  Technology and Financial  sector  dummies; Ln_Age  equal to the logged age of the firm at the  time of the
IPO.  Asterisks (***,  **,  *) denote statistical significance  at the  1%, 5%, and 10%  level (respectively).  The number
of dependent observations  equal to 1 is in brackets.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Gross  Gross ROA  ROA  MaGrgn  Marn  Leverage  Leverage
0.023  0.020  -0.001
BankOwner_  5(0.029)  (0.045)  (0.054)
0.033  0.031  -0.015
VC Owner_5  (0.023)  (0.034)  (0.037)
-0.005  -0.104**  0.018
Inside Owner_5  (0.024)  (0.044)  (0.033)
-0.019  0.015  0.014
ank Owner_20  (0.034)  (0.076)  (0.079)
VC Owner  20  ~~0.089**  0.133*  -0.092*
VC Owner_20  o(0.03)  (0.076)  (0.054)
-0.008  0.038  -0.045
Inside Owner_20  (0.017)  (0.035)  (0.032)
Foreign  Owner  -0.038  -0.058  0.016  -0.028  0.069  0.105*
Foreign Owner  (0.037)  (0.041)  (0.056)  (0.054)  (0.068)  (0.064)
0.044**  0.042*  0.048  0.054  -0.079**  -0.089
Technology  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.041)  (0.040)
ancial  -0.059  -0.054**  0.021  0.088  -0.032  -0.066
Financial  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.103)  (0.108)
0.047***  0.049***  -0.006  -0.018  0.048***  0.049***
Ln_Age  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.018)  (0.016)
-0.030  -0.029  0.261***  0.196**  0.093  0.126***
Intercept  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.082)  (0.082)  (0.049)*  (0.050)
No of Observations  130  130  130  130  130
R-Squared  0.17  0.10  0.17  0.17  0.17
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